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A FRAGMENTED EUROPE IN A 
FRAIL CONGO
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is home to risky contradictions: despite being 
very “rich” in natural resources, it remains consistently “poor” in solid and legitimate state 
structures. Europe conducts numerous efforts to strengthen Congolese social and economic 
infrastructures, offering security and governance support alongside more traditional 
development projects. But its actions suffer from situational ignorance, fragmentation, and 
policy frailty. A coherent and strategic (international) approach is urgently needed to provide 
valuable impetus to the most pressing Congolese needs.
France’s President Sarkozy reviews an honour guard in Kinshasa, 26 March 2009  REUTERS / POOL New
Congo matters. As a country almost ten 
times the size of the UK, it is home to 71 
million people and more than 200 ethnic 
groups speaking as many as 700 different 
languages. Blessed with an abundance of 
natural resources such as metals, minerals, 
forests, and oil, and strategically located 
in the heart of Africa, it is a lucrative com-
modities catch.
But all this wealth is entrenched in ex-
treme forms of corruption, failed economic 
growth, on-going instability, remnants 
of civil war, and the enduring dangers of 
regional spill-overs. With a per capita an-
nual income of about US$189 in 2010, 
the country is still among the poorest 
countries in the world and ranks close to 
bottom on the UN Development Index. 
Meanwhile, militia groups such as the 
Forces Armées de la RDC (FARDC), the pre-
dominantly Hutu Democratic Forces of 
the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and the 
Tutsi-dominated Congress for the Defence 
of the People (CNDP) still imperil stability 
in the Kivu provinces in the east, whereas 
Uganda’s Lord Resistance Army (LRA) has 
continued to severely violate human rights 
and brutally attacks large groups of the 
population in the northeast. International 
and regional peace agreement efforts have 
thus far led to little. 
What the DRC needs most urgently right 
now are transparent governance struc-
tures to provide security and protection for 
its resources, as well as its people. A signif-
icant step in that direction was taken five 
years ago, when the country held its first 
multiparty and – according to internation-
al observers – credible elections for over 40 
years. The upcoming presidential and par-
liamentary elections in November 2011 will 
be important markers as to whether Con-
golese stability and reconstruction is hea-
ding in the right direction. With domestic 
unrest boiling up, and delayed national 
preparations in terms of electoral jurisdic-
tion, budgets, logistical arrangements, and 
voters’ lists, hopes should not be set too 
high. 
The international community has also had 
a slow start on electoral engagements. 
It seriously needs to step up its game to 
avoid the realistic risk that the elections 
will not only destabilise Congo, but the 
entire Great Lakes region, throwing away 
years of reconstruction work. Congo needs 
broad governance support – not least for 
resource regulation – to bounce back poli-
tically and economically. Efforts are emerg-
ing to regulate wood and minerals trade 
as well as the privatised grubbing of ores 
and oil to avoid exploitation. But finding 
stability in a country where President Ka-
bila risks collapse – against a backdrop of 
ever-stronger opposition parties and anti-
government movements – is not reserved 
for the half-committed. That applies on 
the domestic and international levels alike.
Bursting with good intentions, European 
actors have been actively engaged in the 
DRC with development cooperation, hu-
manitarian aid, as well as institutional 
reforms in state and security structures. 
But Europe’s presence in the country actu-
ally represents more loose ends than sub-
stantial progress. European engagement 
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lacks coherence, lacks strategy, and leaves 
far too much scope for other internation-
al actors to sidestep principles of “good 
governance”. With elections knocking on 
Congolese doors, it is time for some Euro-
pean self-reflection, and more importantly, 
action.  
Europe in the DRC: Much ado 
about nothing?
As the DRC’s major export trading part-
ner for diamonds, precious metals, coffee, 
petroleum, and timber, the EU’s ambitions 
to manage the country’s political risk are 
not surprising - even if the EU-DRC policy 
discourse has deafened some of these 
commercial drivers. Whatever the inten-
tions, Europe at least seems busy working 
to improve the DRC politically, socially, and 
economically. It has also come to under-
stand that cross-sector good governance is 
the key to reducing poverty and triggering 
sustainable economic growth – both cru-
cial factors in resource-rich, yet politically 
shaky countries such as the DRC. 
Besides trade agreements and traditional 
development efforts on education, health, 
and transport infrastructure, the Euro-
pean Commission’s core focus lies with 
the reconstruction of Congo’s “political” 
infrastructure. The Indicative National 
Programme of the 10th European Devel-
opment Fund (EDF) for 2008–2013 clearly 
places more emphasis on good governance 
than the previous one. Projects in this area 
concentrate on democratisation, human 
rights, and institutional reform. The Council 
is indeed meant to be a boil for the Com-
mission on the security front within the 
framework of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). The civilian missions 
EUPOL and EUSEC DRC are reforming the 
Congolese police and military structures, 
respectively, looking to enrich governance 
approaches with a sharper security touch. 
Much of this builds on prior EU engage-
ment in Congo. Peace, security, and stabi-
lisation have long been the underpinnings 
of EU priorities in the DRC. CSDP has not 
left the country since the military EU ope- 
ration Artemis was launched in 2003 – its 
first operation on the African continent. 
Since then, the EU has focused its civilian 
crisis management activities in the coun-
try on security sector reform – spanning 
police, army, and justice. The Commission 
has engaged in the training of an Integrat-
ed Police Unit in 2004, an effort that has 
– at least temporarily – been sustained by 
the CSDP police mission EUPOL Kinshasa 
(2005–2007). In addition, bilateral projects 
– some more related to EU efforts than 
others – especially from France, the UK, 
and Belgium, have supported political and 
security sector reforms.
The hitch with all this is that while it 
sounds good, operational impacts have 
actually been remarkably limited. The DRC 
even seems to be slipping down the list of 
European political priorities, so much so 
that Catherine Ashton only on 2 August 
2011 decided to launch a short-term Elec-
tion Observation Mission to the country 
for the November elections. This might 
seem like a minor omission, but it under-
lines some of the broader policy areas 
where Europe is falling short. 
Lost in coordination
One of the major dangers is that all Euro-
pean activities in the DRC – however well 
intended – are occurring more or less in-
dependently from each other in the same 
territory. On a good day, that results in 
policy overlap; on a bad day, in utter policy 
contradictions. Whereas the Commission 
supports governance from the EU budget 
in a long-term framework, the Council 
thinks short-term and draws from a mix 
of budgets; civilian missions are funded 
by the Commission, military operations by 
the member states, with common costs for 
the latter covered by the Athena mecha-
nism. Just to add to the complexity, EUSEC, 
a civilian mission with a military focus, is 
funded by member states’ budgets. 
The EU could make this puzzle fit rather 
effortlessly, though. Clarity and (limited) 
imagination are all that is needed. CSDP 
should function as the short-term tech-
nical implementation of security reform, 
and have the EU Delegation represent the 
more long-term political support of these 
projects. This would also make the current 
randomness in deciding on the extension 
of CSDP missions impossible. The Council 
and Commission should become comple-
mentary in theatre and pool (institutional 
and technical) resources where possible, 
and as such could distinguish more clearly 
between technical and political support – 
there seems to be rather little of the latter. 
According to a textbook implementation 
of Lisbon, the EU Delegation in the DRC 
– now under the framework of the newly 
established European External Action 
Service (EEAS) – escorts CSDP missions 
politically. But integrated structures re-
main precisely that, textbook material, not 
operational realities. Even where European 
or international coordination platforms 
do exist in the DRC, they usually involve 
representatives from the EU Delegation, 
but invariably overlook the Heads of on-
going CSDP missions.
Rather, it is other international organi-
sations (e.g., MONUSCO) and countries 
operating bilaterally in Congo that tend to 
attend such platforms, which presents an-
other serious problem: EU member states 
with big budgets for the DRC are reluctant 
to contribute to any of the CSDP missions. 
The UK is the best example on this front; 
a budget of about £60 million earmarked 
largely for good governance far outstrips 
EU commitments. Yet conversely, member 
states such as Belgium and some of the 
Nordic countries use EUPOL and EUSEC 
DRC to let their own foreign policies shine. 
Everybody is playing national games in 
Congo; they just have very different ways 
of going about it.
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Wanted: Strategy 
Here lies one of the core problems of 
Europe’s presence in the DRC: diverse 
agendas, and a lack of strategy. Long- and 
short-term thinking are not aligned, let 
alone embedded in matching frameworks 
that correspond to Congolese needs. What 
is perhaps worse is that this lack of strat-
egy originates from European ignorance of 
Congolese political, security, and cultural 
contexts.
Despite frequent references to “local own-
ership”, Congolese authorities seem to be 
largely lukewarm to keeping EU initiatives 
going. Especially the difficulties faced by 
Western actors when executing (sensitive) 
security sector reforms have highlighted 
the distrust of the Kabila government 
towards pan-European initiatives. A good 
example: The Integrated Police Unit (suc-
cessfully set up by the EU in 2005) no 
longer exists. The reason: a 1,000-man 
strong organised police force in a cha-
otic country like the DRC appeared far too 
large, too forceful, and thus too threat-
ening to public, well, disorder. Although 
established to support the transition 
government in 2005 (with a microcosm 
of Congolese political membership popu-
lating its ranks), it became unclear which 
authority could hold them responsible.
The Commission’s efforts in the eastern 
provinces would also benefit from an in-
tegrated approach. The EC’s Humanitar-
ian Aid Department ECHO represented in 
Goma has, over the past years, faced many 
problems in tracing internally displaced 
people to provide them with required aid. 
ECHO personnel work irrespective of polit-
ical associations and ethnic backgrounds – 
so outside of formal state structures, often 
in collaboration with rebels. But one of the 
major challenges they face are logistics 
and infrastructure – allegedly a priority un-
der the 10th EDF – to get the aid where it is 
most needed. 
The effect of all this is clear; good inten-
tions and admittedly some serious efforts 
in the field are not enough to fix states 
such as Congo. What is needed is a far 
more ambitious approach that combines 
a thorough understanding of the local 
situation with a strong dialogue between 
Congolese authorities and all relevant 
European actors from the planning phase 
onwards. There is no point in fixing a state 
without a strategic approach that is built 
on well-defined realistic objectives. 
The good news is that Europe has “stra-
tegic promise”, but it desperately needs 
to rethink the division of labour between 
various EU institutions, as well as between 
the EU and member states. Merely put-
ting an EU Special Representative for the 
Great Lakes region in place for coordina-
tion purposes is not going to do the job, 
in particular when he is given a mandate 
with a wobbly future. Only by bringing ac-
tions together in one coherent package 
will meaningful and sustainable progress 
be made. National and institutional agen-
das have to stop going it alone and start 
aligning interests, and they need to do so 
relatively quickly.
Congo beyond Europe
While Europe is pre-occupied with the ob-
vious symbolic value of showing, or want-
ing to show, that it is good at fixing states, 
other actors, perhaps less concerned about 
good governance, are finding their way to 
the country’s resources. The presence of 
commodities – especially copper – makes 
the commercial interests in Congo consid-
erable. That explains why China is invest-
ing in infrastructure to get resources out, 
and why the US and South Africa are not 
letting go of DRC exports. 
But it will take massive amounts of sup-
port, political will, and hard work to pro-
perly develop resource-rich provinces 
such as Katanga to manage political risk 
effectively and to allow for mature trade 
relations to develop. This does at least of-
fer considerable scope for international 
cooperation. Ensuring macroeconomic sta-
bility in the DRC via greater transparency 
and sound economic management will be 
crucial to underpin sustainable growth. 
Broader cooperation between the EU, 
China, and the US is clearly needed to 
manage fluctuating commodity prices 
and private debt buyers hindering macro-
economic stabilisation – conditions that 
European policy makers today have come 
to understand within their own borders.
But broader governance reforms and un-
derlying political stability are the founda-
tions upon which the DRC’s success will 
ultimately be built. Europe remains a cru-
cial player in this arena, with an overall aid 
budget that still outstrips development in-
vestments of other “emerging” actors op-
erational in the region. Europe cannot po-
litically afford failure in the DRC any more 
than the Great Lakes region can muddle 
through without stability emanating from 
Kinshasa. Unfortunately, in the absence 
of any serious strategic rethinking, both 
between EU Member States and politi-
cal actors in the DRC itself, this is exactly 
where we are heading. The upcoming elec-
tions will be critical: if European electoral 
involvement flops, the wheels will fall off. 
If things go well, the really hard govern-
ance work needs to start once the ballot 
boxes are put away.
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